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Abstract 
Technologies to reduce significantly fossil-fuel emissions currently are unavailable or only 
available at high cost. In light of this, the amount of research on the pace, direction, and benefits of 
environmentally friendly technological change has grown dramatically in recent years. This research 
includes empirical estimates of these effects and modeling exercises designed to simulate endogenous 
technological change in response to climate policy. Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to 
connect these two streams of research. This paper attempts to bridge that gap, reviewing both the 
empirical and modeling literature on technological change.  
Our goal is to provide an agenda for how both empirical and modeling research in these areas can 
move forward in a complementary fashion. In doing so, we discuss how models used for policy 
evaluation can better capture empirical phenomena and how empirical research can better address the 
needs of models used for policy evaluation. 
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Endogenizing Technological Change:  
Matching Empirical Evidence to Modeling Needs 
William A. Pizer and David Popp∗ 
Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed an explosion of research into the process of technological 
innovation. To a large degree, this research has proceeded in two distinct directions: exploring 
mechanisms to endogenize the process of productivity change in dynamic models used to 
evaluate public policy, particularly in the arena of climate change, and exploring various 
empirical, microeconomic questions surrounding the process of invention, innovation, and 
diffusion of individual technologies. There have been a number of studies reviewing these two 
trends separately (Gillingham et al. 2007; Löschel 2002; Popp 2005; Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 
2003). However, there has been little attempt to tie these two literatures together and, in 
particular, to suggest an agenda for future work. How can models used for policy evaluation 
better capture empirical phenomena, and how can empirical research better address the needs of 
models used for policy evaluation? The purpose of this paper is to examine these two questions.  
In the area of climate change, it is hard to overstate the importance of estimating the 
expected path of technological change and the potential for public policies to influence that path. 
Kneese and Schultz (1978) argued that the potential to spur technological innovation may be the 
single most important criteria for environmental policy “over the long haul.” Their applications 
were typical environmental problems where attention was focused on achieving rapid 
improvements in environmental quality immediately. Solutions were at hand and interest in 
technological change focused on incremental improvements to existing technologies— 
improvements like higher efficiency, cleaner fuels and cheaper end-of-pipe treatment—that 
might arise but were not essential to achieving societal goals. The long haul attracted the 
attention of Kneese and Schultz but was not the focus of stakeholders and policymakers. In sharp 
contrast, climate change focuses squarely on the long haul. 
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Addressing climate change means, for many people, stabilizing atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at a “safe” level.1 There is no rapid 
improvement to be sought right now, and stabilization at almost any plausible level will require 
entirely different technologies for transportation and, likely, power generation.2 This requires us 
to make predictions about new technologies—like Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
(IGCC) with capture and sequestration and hydrogen- and electric-fueled vehicles—rather than 
the kinds of incremental changes typically imagined, for example, with SO2 scrubbers.3 Indeed, 
recent studies of various stabilization scenarios for the United States focused much of their 
attention on technological development and assumptions (Clarke et al. 2006) 
This inherent link between technological development and successfully addressing 
climate change means that modeling technological change is no longer an academic exercise. 
Stern (2006) recently estimated that greenhouse gases could be stabilized at 550 ppmv CO2e, or 
about 450 ppmv CO2, for an estimated 1 percent of global world product.4 He included a notional 
confidence interval of as much as a 4 percent loss but also a 2 percent gain. What strikes some 
economists as an optimistic central estimate, and a very optimistic upper-end of the range, 
derives in part from assumptions about technological change and the potential for public policy 
to affect it (Byatt et al. 2006). Yet, the absence of empirical work coupled to modeling 
applications makes it difficult convincingly to say much about those results. Meanwhile, the 
report continues to influence public opinion (Stern 2007). 
Three important concerns underlie the frustration and confusion surrounding the use of 
these and similar estimates in the area of public policy. One is whether the models cited in 
support of the estimates—models that include assumptions about technological developments 
responding to public policy—were intended to provide quantitative results or qualitative insights. 
The former, normative modeling exercises are designed for cost–benefit analysis and are the 
                                                 
1 Economists advocating cost–benefit analysis (Nordhaus 1994; Pizer 2002; Tol 2006) would suggest pricing 
emissions to reflect marginal damages, which might or might not stabilize concentrations. 
2 While often ignored, geo-engineering to address climate with, for example, the emission of reflective particles in 
the atmosphere, would allow us to continue to use conventional technologies and atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide to continue to rise. See IPCC (2007). 
3 In some ways, these are not entirely “new”─ IGCC plants exist, CO2 has been captured and sequestered for 
enhanced oil recovery for some time, and electric cars exist. However, these technologies (or proposed alternatives) 
remain unproven at the necessary scale and uncompetitive with cheap, conventional alternatives. 
4 Note that concentrations already have risen from 315 ppmv CO2 to 380 from 1956 to 2006─ suggesting 450 will 
be breeched without significant action in the next 50 years. 
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appropriate basis for Stern-like assessments. The latter, positive exercises are designed to draw 
qualitative insights about behavior but may or may not be calibrated to match important 
quantitative benchmarks. While few models would define themselves explicitly as one or the 
other, it is nonetheless important to understand what kind of confidence the modelers themselves 
have in their results.  
Second, there are many outstanding empirical questions in the literature on technological 
change, and modelers are not always transparent about how they have chosen to answer these 
questions. Even in cases where the modelers, in fact, may have a great deal of confidence in their 
results, users may wish to be aware of what beliefs regarding these unanswered questions are 
being fed into the model’s assumptions. 
Third, approaching this from the standpoint of theory, how much have the present suite of 
models sought to capture empirical features and recent research surrounding the innovation 
process? Diffusion of new technologies, for example, has been much studied in the empirical 
literature, but because many models do not identify individual, emerging technologies, their 
treatment of diffusion is quite crude. 
To help shed some light on these issues, this paper walks through key features in both the 
literature on dynamic policy simulation and empirical studies of technological innovation and 
diffusion: the research and development process, learning by doing, the role of public versus 
private research, and technology diffusion. In each case, we consider what economists know 
about the issue, what modelers have done, what empirical questions the modelers’ approaches 
raise, and what empirical features the modelers have ignored. We end by reviewing the agenda 
for empirical work and model development that we have accumulated in each section. 
The R&D Process 
New ideas are developed through research and development (R&D) projects. The process 
of R&D is costly, requiring the investment of capital by firms and government and the skills of 
highly trained research scientists. The economic influences on innovation can be divided into 
two broad categories. Economists refer to innovation responding to the needs of the marketplace 
as a demand-pull influence. In contrast, new research opportunities provided by scientific 
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advances are referred to as a technology-push influence.5 For example, advances in basic 
semiconductor materials were necessary to make solar energy feasible. Both of these affect the 
expected marginal rate of return (MRR) of innovation. Demand-pull influences raise the MRR 
by making the potential innovation more valuable. For example, innovation on pollution-control 
devices is only beneficial to a firm in the presence of environmental regulation, so that there will 
be a market for the device. Similarly, basic scientific advances increase potential returns by 
improving the likelihood that a research project will succeed. Finally, the innovative policy 
climate also is important. To earn profits from innovation, inventors must be able to appropriate 
the returns from their efforts. This can vary depending on factors such as the level of intellectual 
property rights and the type of innovation.  
Key Features 
When modeling innovation, the most important feature is that knowledge markets are 
imperfect. In most cases, new technologies must be made available to the public for the inventor 
to reap the rewards of invention. However, by making new inventions public, some, if not all, of 
the knowledge embodied in the invention becomes public knowledge. This public knowledge 
may lead to additional innovations or even to copies of the current innovation.6 These knowledge 
spillovers provide benefit to the public as a whole but not to the innovator.  
Economists studying the returns to research consistently find that knowledge spillovers 
result in a wedge between private and social rates of return to R&D. As a result, private firms do 
not have incentives to provide the socially optimal level of research activity. Examples of such 
studies include Mansfield (1977, 1996), Pakes (1985), Jaffe (1986), Hall (1996), and Jones and 
Williams (1998). Typical results include marginal social rates of return between 30 percent and 
50 percent. In comparison, estimates of private marginal rates of return on investments in 
physical capital range from 7 percent to 15 percent (Bazelon and Smetters 1999; Jones and 
Williams 1998; Hall 1996). Popp (2001, 2003) finds similar results specifically looking at 
environmental R&D. Since firms make investment decisions based on their private returns, the 
wedge between private and social rates of return suggests socially beneficial research 
                                                 
5 For examples, see Scherer (1965), Schmookler (1966), Rosenberg (1974, 1982), and Mowrey and Rosenberg 
(1979). 
6 Intellectual property rights, such as patents, are designed to protect inventors from such copies. However, their 
effectiveness varies depending on the ease in which inventors may “invent around” the patent by making minor 
modifications to an invention. See, for example, Levin et al. (1987). 
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opportunities are being ignored by firms because they are unable to fully capture the rewards of 
such innovations. 
These spillovers have two important implications for models of environmental policy. 
First, it means that even if policies to correct the environmental externalities are in place, the 
level of environmental R&D still will be suboptimal. Because they ignore the positive spillovers 
created by R&D, firms will underinvest in research activity. This suggests two possible avenues 
through which policy can encourage the development of environmentally friendly technologies: 
correcting the environmental externality or correcting knowledge-market failures. Ideally, 
policies addressing knowledge-market failures address these issues for the economy as a whole, 
rather than just for environmental innovation. Examples of policies designed to encourage 
additional R&D include patent protection, broad government R&D subsidies, and generic R&D 
tax credits. Indeed, in studies on the potential effects of energy R&D for climate-change 
mitigation, Schneider and Goulder (1997) and Otto et al. (2006) show that policies to address 
knowledge spillovers are more effective if they address all knowledge spillovers, rather than 
focusing on R&D pertaining to alternative energy. Moreover, papers such as Popp (2006a) and 
Newell and Fischer (2005) find that using R&D subsidies alone, without environmental policies 
also in place, is not an effective climate-policy measure. While R&D subsidies encourage the 
creation of new technologies, they do not create incentives for the adoption of new technologies. 
A second important consequence of knowledge spillovers is that they create potentially 
high opportunity costs for increasing environmental R&D. Evidence of high social returns to 
R&D is found not just in the environmental sector but throughout the entire economy. As such, 
any environmental R&D that comes at the expense of other R&D will have high opportunity 
costs. For example, consider an economy in which aggregate output, Yt, is devoted to 
consumption, Ct, investment in physical capital, It, or two types of research: environmental, RE,t, 
and other, RO,t, so that: 
(1) Yt = Ct + It + RE,t+ RO,t 
When environmental R&D increases by one dollar, one less dollar is available for the 
other activities. The opportunity cost of the first two simply is valued at one dollar. However, if 
the social rate of return is four times higher for R&D than for physical capital investments, 
giving up a dollar of other R&D activity has the same future effect as giving up four dollars of 
physical investment. 
This is important because empirical work suggests that at least some environmental R&D 
will displace other forms of R&D. Research activities are carried out by highly trained scientists 
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and engineers. Since years of training are needed to enter the field, the supply of scientists and 
engineers available at any one time is inelastic—it cannot be increased quickly when new 
research needs arise. For example, Goolsbee (1998) finds that one of the chief beneficiaries of 
R&D tax subsidies are scientists and engineers, who receive larger wages when subsidies are 
increased. Similarly, Popp (2004a) presents evidence that approximately one-half of the energy 
R&D spending that took place in the 1970s and 1980s came at the expense of other R&D.  
What We Know about the Response of R&D to Policy 
There is a growing body of empirical literature that links environmental policy to 
innovation. Most of these studies have focused on estimating the direction or magnitude of the 
relationship between policy and innovation. Using international patent data, Lanjouw and Mody 
(1996) find a correlation across nations between patenting in environmental fields and pollution-
abatement expenditures. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) look at the same relationship across U.S. 
industries. Comparing pollution-abatement data and innovation data across these industries, they 
estimate a positive elasticity of pollution-control R&D with respect to pollution-control 
expenditures of 0.15. However, when estimating the same relationship using patents as the 
measure of innovation, they do not find evidence of a relationship between patenting and 
pollution-abatement expenditures. Finally, Brunneimer and Cohen (2003) find that patents 
increase by just 0.04 percent when pollution-abatement costs and expenditures increase by $1 
million. While both of these papers find small effects, they also use aggregate measures of 
technological change. Each looks at innovation within specific industries. Jaffe and Palmer 
include all patents and all R&D associated with an industry, whether or not they are 
environmental technologies. Thus, their results show a small increase in overall inventive 
activity, but do not show if additional environmental R&D takes place at the expense of other 
R&D. Brunneimer and Cohen focus specifically on environmental technologies but group 
several such technologies together for each industry. Thus, the effects of innovation on specific 
technologies may be masked by stagnant trends in other technologies. 
In each of these studies, pollution-abatement expenditures serve as a proxy for the 
stringency of environmental regulation. Other papers use energy prices and related regulations as 
the mechanism that induces innovation. Although the observed price changes might not be 
policy-related, the results also can be applied to situations where policy affects prices, such as a 
carbon tax. Newell et al. (1999) use an approach closely related to hedonic techniques to study 
the effect of both energy prices and energy-efficiency regulations on technological advances in 
energy efficiency for air conditioners and natural gas water heaters. They find that energy prices 
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have the largest inducement effect, although they do not estimate a price elasticity. Popp (2002) 
uses patent data to study the relationship between energy prices and innovative activity. Using a 
distributed lag model, he estimates a long-run elasticity of energy R&D with respect to energy 
prices of 0.35. The median lag occurs in 4.9 years, suggesting that more than one-half of the full 
effect on R&D of an energy-price increase will have been experienced after just five years. Thus, 
prices (or other regulations that increase the cost of using fossil fuels) can be expected to 
stimulate new research quickly.  
Modeling Approaches in Practice 
That innovation responds to incentives suggests that modeling accurately induced 
technological change is important, as the path of climate-friendly technology will vary in 
scenarios with and without policy. As a result, models used to evaluate the cost and effects of 
climate-change mitigation policies increasingly have explored ways to endogenize the effect of 
R&D on technology and mitigation costs. They generally have included a variable representing 
R&D or “knowledge” that influenced economic behavior through one of three routes: a direct 
effect on the level of emissions intensity, a reduction in the mitigation cost function, or 
productivity gains in sectoral production functions (with sector-specific R&D stocks in multi-
sectoral models). At the same time, these models have pursued a range of approaches to 
matching different pieces of empirical evidence described above. 
For example, Nordhaus (2002) assumes that the rate of growth in emissions intensity is a 
function of the annual R&D directed at carbon saving: 
(2)    3 1
2 / Ψ − Ψ =
Ψ
•
t t t R σ σ
where σt is the industrial carbon energy/output ratio at year t (implying   is the rate 
of change of the carbon energy-output ratio), Rt is the R&D inputs into the carbon-energy sector 
in year t, and the Ψi are parameters (calibrated assuming optimized R&D in the past). 
Importantly, he (a) assumes that the cost of a dollar of R&D is four dollars of output—reflecting 
the opportunity cost of displaced R&D in other sectors—and (b) calibrates the model so that in 
the baseline without climate policy, the return to additional R&D also is four times higher than 
ordinary investment. Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti (2003) take a similar approach in that they 
focus on R&D affecting emissions intensity but instead use a stock of accumulated R&D (versus 
the flow above) to affect the level of emissions intensity (versus the rate of change above). Their 
R&D stock also influences overall productivity, building in significant spillovers among 
different types of R&D. Given these different approaches to modeling spillovers and opportunity 
t t σ σ /
•
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costs, it may not be that surprising that Nordhaus finds relatively small effects from 
endogenizing R&D, while Buonanno et al. find much larger effects (see Edenhofer et al. 2006). 
Popp (2004a) also uses a knowledge stock that reduces emissions intensity. But his 
ENTICE model allows additional substitution—both out of energy as a whole and out of carbon-
emitting energy and into an alternative, carbon-free technology represented by the knowledge 
stock. He uses this model to focus in on the effects of crowding out on the gains from induced 
innovation in climate-change models. The base case of ENTICE assumes that one-half of new 
energy R&D crowds out other R&D. In this case, induced technological change increases 
welfare by 9.4 percent. Assuming no crowding out increases the welfare gains from induced 
technological change to as much as 45.3 percent. Similarly, assuming full crowding out of R&D 
reduces welfare gains to as little as 1.9 percent.7 
The preceding approach can be viewed as an evolution toward knowledge as an ordinary 
factor of production versus an exceptional device for lowering costs. Goulder and Mathai (2000) 
are a parallel step on that journey. They assume that accumulated R&D— knowledge— 
influences mitigation costs. Their cost function, therefore, depends on both the abatement level 
and the stock of knowledge:   where At is the abatement level, Ht is the stock of 
knowledge, and C() is the abatement cost function. They make particular assumptions about 
functional form (C() is proportional to H
-1) and knowledge accumulation (including adjustment 
costs). Finally, they calibrate the model so that when knowledge accumulation is allowed, it 
lowers costs by 30 percent (based on work by Manne and Richels [1992]). Not surprisingly, they 
find that endogenizing technological change lowers costs by about 30 percent. 
) , ( t t H A C
Finally, multi-sector general equilibrium models allow one to move away from mitigation 
cost functions and to think concretely about R&D influencing costs and productivity in particular 
sectors, such as “carbon free energy” or even a particular energy-generating technology. Goulder 
and Schneider (1999) do this in a seven-sector model where spillovers exist within, but not 
among, each sector. That is, each sector has a top-level constant elasticity of substitution 
production function of the form 
                                                 
7 Popp (2004a) presents upper and lower bounds of the influence of opportunity costs. The upper-bound estimates 
assume that R&D levels change as the opportunity costs change. The lower-bound estimates change the opportunity 
costs but constrain R&D to remain at the base-case levels. The later can be interpreted as the gains from removing 
the assumption of partial crowding-out. They are not the gains that would result if the government intervened to 
remedy the problem of partial crowding-out. 
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(3) 
1/ () ( ) HG QHH G
ρ ρρ γα α =+  
where Q is total output, H is appropriable sector-specific knowledge, G is an aggregate of other 
inputs, and H  is non-appropriable sector-specific knowledge (α’s and ρ are parameters). Both H 
and H  accumulate research Rt, with a parameter β governing how much spills over into the non-
appropriable stock. 
They have a specific R&D sector, which also creates the possibility of crowding out as 
marginal R&D costs increase with supply. Without spillovers, they find that endogenizing 
technological change creates the possibility of lowering the cost of achieving a given emissions 
target. With spillovers, this effect can be muted or reinforced depending on the pattern of 
spillovers across sectors. In particular, they find that asymmetries in spillovers matter more than 
other specification choices. 
Summarizing Behavior 
The R&D modeling discussion is organized around two overarching questions: the form 
of the model (whether it focuses on emissions intensity, abatement cost, or sectoral productivity) 
and the parameterization of R&D effects. That is, the assumptions about the return to R&D 
investments (e.g., spillovers) and the opportunity costs of the endogenous R&D (e.g., crowding 
out). Regardless of form, the parameterization determines how endogenizing technological 
change affects the results relative to an exogenous technology assumption. 
The single most important feature in these models is how the model accounts for 
imperfections in knowledge markets that produce high social rates of return. Models that omit 
these imperfections fail to capture both above-market-rate returns to climate-related R&D and 
above-market-rate returns to other R&D that exist. In cases where they are calibrated to have 
such returns without these imperfections, allowing the models to then equilibrate R&D and 
market returns will either: 1) overestimate the level of innovative activity that will be induced by 
climate policy; or 2) implicitly assume that appropriate government policies to correct R&D 
market imperfections will accompany climate policy, so that social and private rates of return are 
equalized. Thus, while such results may not be incorrect, it is important to note that results from 
models that do not explicitly include R&D market imperfections would not be obtained without 
government support for R&D. Moreover, these models not only assume that government 
provides R&D support but that it provides this support in an optimal manner so the gap between 
private and public returns is closed. 
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To aid understanding of how spillovers are included in models, we can imagine two 
summary statistics that quantify the key assumptions. First, the magnitude of spillovers can be 
measured by a simulation showing how an incremental dollar of environmental R&D changes 
welfare, instituted by an exogenous, “manna-from-heaven” increase in the environmental R&D 
budget. Positive spillovers would suggest, for example, that an additional $1 million of R&D 
should improve welfare by more than $1 million.8 Second, the model should be simulated with a 
climate policy in place and the environmental R&D budget both frozen at the reference-case 
level and determined endogenously. Here, it would useful to calculate the change in welfare 
divided by the change in environmental R&D expenditures. This would represent an estimate 
combining both positive spillover effects and the opportunity costs of R&D. A positive number 
would indicate that spillovers from environmental R&D exceed any opportunity costs; a negative 
number would indicate they do not. In simpler models, these measures would be synonymous 
with the parameter choice. In the multi-sector models, the latter question tends to be lurking in 
assumptions about the increasing cost of R&D and the pattern of R&D returns in various sectors. 
This has the appearance of being more structural but begs the question of the degree of spillovers 
across sectors, something Goulder and Schneider (1999) ignore and something about which the 
empirical literature is silent. 
A second pertinent question is how the marginal effects noted above evolve as a 
simulation deviates from the baseline. Put another way, what is the longer term potential for 
innovative activity? The original literature (see, for example, Leontief 1966) on computable 
general equilibrium modeling emphasized its usefulness for analyzing relatively small changes 
from a baseline, yet what climate-change models frequently are asked is how an entirely 
different future might evolve. Is the potential for large rates of return unlimited or will large 
increases in R&D result in diminishing returns? For example, Popp (2006b) finds evidence that 
diminishing returns to R&D are most prominent when large spikes in R&D occur. In the case of 
technological change, it would be useful to know how different model forms and 
parameterizations translate into long-term potential for cost-saving or productivity-enhancing 
R&D. 
                                                 
8 While the empirical literature predicts returns of roughly a 4:1 ratio, note that this will be slightly higher if the 
welfare calculation in the model includes avoided damages from clean technology. That is because studies finding a 
4:1 ratio of social to private returns for R&D focus on returns measurable in markets. Any environmental benefits 
that occur will be in addition to this 4:1 ratio. 
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This question of deviations from the baseline recalls our earlier remark on the importance 
of how well these models have been calibrated to match important quantitative benchmarks. Do 
they match historic rates of productivity improvement in the baseline simulations? Do historic 
responses to price changes match simulated behavior? While such calibrations are less important 
for qualitative conclusions from simulation modeling, they become increasingly important if 
simulations are used for normative policy evaluation. 
Looking Forward 
A key observation from the preceding discussion is that often it is unclear what 
simulation models are calibrated to deliver, how far simulations are deviating from baseline 
behavior, and how the technology parameterization translates into intermediate conclusions 
about the returns to R&D and opportunity costs. A very useful near-term research agenda for the 
modeling community would be to clearly articulate the following summary features of models 
featuring endogenous technological change going forward: 
1.  Baseline productivity growth (e.g., per capita income). 
2.  Near-, medium-, and long-term elasticity of energy demand, in aggregate, and for 
different sectors, if present. 
3.  For policy simulations, report the range of variation in key relative prices (among 
various energy sources and aggregate consumption) and compare to historic price 
variation.  
4.  Elasticities of energy R&D with respect to changes in energy prices. Are these 
consistent with existing empirical evidence? 
5.  Clearly state assumptions used about R&D markets. Are spillovers modeled 
(either explicitly or implicitly)? What is the source of new energy R&D spending? 
6.  Estimate the marginal returns to energy R&D. Do this both through an exogenous, 
incremental increase in energy- or carbon-related-R&D, as well as by simulating 
climate policy with and without energy R&D frozen at reference levels (see 
comment in text). 
7.  Estimate the potential for long-term returns to energy R&D. As before, do this 
both through an exogenous, doubling (or other nonincremental change) in energy- 
or carbon-related-R&D, as well as by simulated climate policy with and without 
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energy R&D frozen at reference levels (but here considering a more aggressive, 
nonincremental climate policy). 
Multi-sector general equilibrium models present additional data challenges. In particular, 
as those models contemplate specific knowledge stocks in different sectors—and often in 
different geographic regions—they require information quantifying spillovers not just in a given 
domestic industry, where most of the empirical literature has focused, but across industries and 
countries or regions. This is particularly important for energy R&D, since energy is an input to 
all production processes. Thus, fundamental research on new energy technologies may serve as a 
general-purpose technology that provides returns throughout the economy.9 This would be a 
useful area for additional empirical work. 
Another area for future research is the role of technological change in baseline 
simulations. While climate policy increases incentives for emissions-reducing R&D, some 
emissions R&D can occur even without policy. This is particularly true for R&D that improves 
energy efficiency, which is encouraged by higher energy prices that may or may not be the result 
of environmental policy (see, for example, Popp 2002). Moreover, while large-scale climate 
policies only have recently taken hold (such as trading of carbon emissions permits in the 
European Union), several smaller policies have helped encourage the development of climate-
friendly technologies. Policies such as government R&D subsidies, investment tax credits for 
renewable energy, and renewable portfolio standards all play a role in encouraging the 
development of these technologies. Any model that calibrates energy markets to current data 
trends will include technological change induced by current market forces and policies in the 
baseline. Given this, baseline runs are more appropriately interpreted as runs assuming 
extensions of existing policies rather than no policy. Moreover, rather than considering all 
technological change to occur as a result of climate policy, the appropriate question is what is the 
marginal increase in technology that occurs because of newly introduced climate policy.  
Learning by Doing 
The popular alternative (or compliment) to modeling technological change as a function 
of R&D is to model technological progress—particularly the lowering of costs of an existing 
technology—as a response to increased production, or learning by doing (LBD). As noted, the 
                                                 
9 Helpman (1998) provides an introduction to general-purpose technologies. 
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consequence of endogenous versus exogenous technological change through explicit, additional 
R&D expenditures depends on the relative importance of spillovers versus crowding out. The 
consequence of endogenous versus exogenous technological change through LBD is 
unambiguously positive: there is no opportunity cost other than the current cost of production. 
This suggests that assumptions of one mechanism or another will have important implications for 
model results. Most importantly, the potential of crowding out of R&D implies a higher 
opportunity cost to technological change that progresses via R&D, rather than by LBD. In 
contrast, investing in new energy technology (as in the LBD framework) does not include this 
added social cost. 
Key Features 
Because the social costs of technological change are lower in the LBD framework, 
models relying on LBD tend to provide larger estimates of the potential gains from endogenous 
technological change. Thus, an important empirical question is the relevant importance of each 
type of learning. Unfortunately, few empirical studies address this question. Such research is 
limited both by data availability (as measures of costs, technology usage, and matching R&D 
data would be needed) and concerns over endogeneity of key variables. A typical learning curve 
model regresses costs as a function of cumulative capacity: 
(4) Cost = A·CumCapt
-α 
where Cost is the cost of investment of a new installation, and CumCap is the cumulative 
installed capacity of (or sometimes cumulative output produced by) the technology prior to  
time t. 
Recently, papers by Klaassen et al. (2003), Söderholm and Sundqvist (2003), and 
Söderholm and Klaassen (2007) have extended this basic model to estimate “two-factor” 
learning curves for environmental technologies. These two-factor curves model cost reductions 
as a function of both cumulative capacity (LBD) and R&D (learning by searching, or LBS). In 
these models, R&D typically is aggregated into a stock of R&D capital to be comparable with 
the notion of cumulative capacity. Thus, endogeneity is a concern, as we would expect both 
investments in capacity to be a function of past R&D expenditures and R&D expenditures to be 
influenced by capacity, which helps determine demand for R&D. Söderholm and Sundqvist 
(2003) address this endogeneity in their paper and find learning-by-doing rates around 5 percent 
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and learning-by-searching rates around 15 percent, suggesting that R&D, rather than LBD, 
contributes more to cost reductions.10  
This work is preliminary and needs to be replicated with other data sets before it can be 
considered a definitive answer to the relative role of LBD versus LBS. However, it can be used 
to provide some guidelines for modeling technological change. First, it suggests that both 
mechanisms (LBD and LBS) are relevant. As of yet, however, no study has addressed potential 
interactions between LBD and LBS. For example, experience may reveal which attributes of a 
technology need attention and thus inform the direction of future R&D. Second, it suggests that 
the relative importance of each must be considered when calibrating models including both types 
of learning. The main lesson here is to avoid double counting. A learning-by-doing rate of just 
five percent is lower than typically reported in the LBD literature, where learning rates of 15 
percent to 20 percent are common. A simple, one-factor LBD curve shows the relationship 
between capacity and costs but does not address causation. A two-factor curve begins to address 
this causation. As such, while the combined effect of LBD and LBS in a two-factor model may 
be comparable to learning rates from a one-factor model, the individual components should be 
smaller. 
Modeling Approaches in Practice 
Despite concerns about causality, the empirical tractability of learning curves has led to 
the wide use of learning-induced technological change throughout the literature, particularly in 
disaggregated, “bottom-up” models (including the NEMS model used by the Energy Information 
Administration; EIA 2003). Disaggregated models are well-suited for incorporating learning 
because of their rich technology specificity, which more easily lends itself to a learning curve for 
each technology. Some more aggregated models also use learning, but it is not as common. One 
reason is that learning tends to be thought of as a technology-specific phenomenon and is 
therefore harder to apply in the typical aggregation of a “top-down” model. 
The most common way to capture learning-induced technological change in climate 
policy models is based on an exponential relation between unit cost and cumulative output, as in 
                                                 
10 To avoid problems with endogeneity, Nemet (2006) uses simulation techniques to decompose cost reductions for 
PV cells into seven categories. Plant size (e.g., returns to scale), efficiency improvements, and lower silicon costs 
explain the majority of cost reductions. Notably, most of the major improvements in efficiency come from 
universities, where traditional LBD through production experience would not be a factor. Learning from experience 
(e.g., through increased yield of PV cells) plays a much smaller role. 
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(4) above. This implies that a doubling of experience will reduce specific costs by a factor of 2
-α, 
also known as the progress rate. This formulation requires only the output and cost history to 
parameterize the learning function. Two-factor learning models, where both cumulative capacity 
and cumulative R&D enter the cost function, can be represented by appending (R&D)
-β to (4).  
A recent summary (Section 11.5, IPCC WGIII 2007) of four bottom-up energy models 
reported single-factor learning models with rates between 4 percent and 19 percent—and in the 
case of solar photovoltaics in the MESSAGE model, 28 percent. Among those models that can 
include two-factor learning models, the second factor tends to be additive; that is, the learning-
by-doing rate remains the same, while the effect of R&D is added. Doubling R&D is modeled to 
have between a 1 percent and 11 percent effect on costs.  
Goulder and Mathai (2000) provide one example of an aggregate approach to modeling 
LBD. Rather than modeling cumulative knowledge to be a function of R&D investment, they 
assume it is a function of abatement. With this specification, current abatement acts as a learning 
investment in knowledge, analogous to R&D investment. The result is similar to many other 
learning-by-doing studies in that both the optimal carbon tax is lower at all points in time and 
that for any given carbon tax, there may be considerably more total abatement. And, as is the 
case with ordinary learning models, the effect of LBD on the slope of the optimal path of 
abatement is ambiguous, as learning both motivates earlier abatement to further lower future 
costs and later abatement to then take advantage of those lower costs. 
Summary and Looking Forward 
Much like the R&D discussion, an important agenda for the modeling community is 
clearer reporting of benchmark model results and responsiveness and comparison to historical, 
empirical data. Among the seven features noted earlier, the first three remain relevant: baseline 
productivity growth; elasticity of energy demand over the near-, medium-, and long-term; and, 
for policy simulations, a comparison of the range of simulated, relative prices compared to 
historic variation. In models that combine R&D and LBD, it is particularly important to conduct 
this type of benchmarking to ensure that the model is not double counting the potential gains 
from technological change and continues to replicate key benchmark features.  
A key challenge for moving our understanding of LBD forward is disentangling the 
causal forces that lead to lower costs. While the statistical correlation between experience and 
lower costs is strong, understanding the causes of cost reductions is necessary to make informed 
policy decisions. Unfortunately, separately identifying the various learning mechanisms is 
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difficult. Learning through experience is confounded with more conventional learning through 
R&D, where R&D may be poorly measured and typically related to output and capacity. An 
important area for further work is to try and disentangle these effects.  
Government R&D 
We have focused primarily on the incentives faced, and activities conducted, by private 
firms. However, governments also play an important role in energy R&D. For example, in 2003, 
U.S. industry spent $1.8 billion on energy R&D (National Science Foundation, 2006), while the 
U.S. Department of Energy spent $2.5 billion (U.S. Department of Energy 2004).11 This 
government investment plays several roles, each of which has important implications for 
climate-policy models.  
First, note that government R&D can help to compensate for underinvestment by private 
firms. Unlike firms, the government is in a position to consider social returns when making 
investment decisions. In addition, government R&D tends to have different objectives than 
private R&D. Government support is particularly important for basic R&D, as long-term 
payoffs, greater uncertainty, and the lack of a finished product make it difficult for private firms 
to appropriate the returns of basic R&D.  
This combination of public and private efforts complicates efforts to model R&D. 
Focusing on private efforts suggests that a wedge should exist between social and private returns 
to R&D. Government R&D aims, at least in part, to close this gap. However, there is little 
empirical evidence specifically on the returns to government R&D. This is due, in part, to the 
nature of government projects, which are often more basic and long term in nature, making 
estimating returns difficult. Given this, estimating the gap between private and social rates of 
return that exist after accounting for both private and public energy R&D spending is an 
important question for future research.12  
If government R&D successfully narrows the gap between private and social rates of 
return, this effect should be acknowledged in baseline models. However, if that is the case, it is 
                                                 
11 Note that this is not the total Department of Energy budget, much of which goes to defense projects. Rather, it is 
Department of Energy budget items focused on energy supply or energy efficiency. 
12 Continued calls for additional government support for energy R&D suggest that government funding has not 
closed this gap completely.  
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also important for models to acknowledge that such policy interventions will need to continue for 
the simulated results to hold. That is, if a baseline simulation implicitly includes existing 
government R&D efforts as part of its calibration, policy simulation must assume that this 
government R&D continues. Furthermore, any additional government R&D that occurs in a 
policy simulation properly should be credited as a marginal increase over baseline government 
R&D efforts.  
In addition to correcting for underinvestment by private firms, many government R&D 
projects aim to improve commercialization of new technologies (or “transfer” from basic to 
applied research). Such projects typically combine basic and applied research and often are 
government/industry partnerships (National Science Board 2006). For example, the United States 
passed several policies in the 1980s specifically designed to improve transfer from the basic 
research done at government and university laboratories to the applied research done by industry 
to create marketable products.13 As such, this technology transfer can be seen as a step between 
the processes of invention and innovation. Empirical work suggests that these policies have had 
the desired effect. For example, Dai, Popp, and Bretschneider (2005) find that the Bayh-Dole 
Act, which facilitated university patenting, led to more university patents but not more R&D, 
suggesting that universities responded to the Bayh-Dole Act by patenting results that previously 
would have gone unpatented.14 Related to energy, Popp (2006b) finds that energy patents 
spawned by government R&D are cited more frequently than other energy patents. More 
importantly, after passage of these technology-transfer acts, the “children” of these patents (the 
privately held patents that cite government patents) are the most frequently cited patents, 
suggesting that transferring research results from the government to private industry produces 
valuable research results. 
The role of government R&D for commercialization is not explicitly modeled in climate-
policy simulations, as most models do not include the necessary level of detail. However, they 
provide important lessons for interpretation. In particular, these results suggest that model results 
on the potential of technological change should be considered a best-case scenario. For such 
results to be realized in practice, policymakers need to be aware of the lessons from the 
                                                 
13 Examples include the Stevenson-Wylder Technology Innovation Act of 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, and the 
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986. 
14 The hope of the Bayh-Dole Act was that these patents would increase licensing opportunities, so that private 
firms would help to market university inventions. See Sampat (2006) for further discussion. 
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microeconomic literature on technology transfer and ensure policies are in place to make optimal 
use of the results of both public and private R&D. 
In the end, simulation models used for policy analysis rarely include government R&D, 
even though government R&D tends to be a frequent policy lever. But, as this section highlights, 
we have little empirical evidence that could be used to model the interaction of public R&D, 
private R&D, and eventual technological change. And, even if such historical evidence existed, it 
might be hard to extrapolate given the wide variety of government R&D activities, management 
structures, and likely effectiveness over time. Perhaps the best guidance for the moment is to 
recognize that current trends in technological change exist alongside substantial government 
expenditures that likely need to continue in order to maintain those baseline trends. Moving 
forward, it would be valuable if future empirical work identified the effect of significant changes 
in government R&D, distinct from private R&D and other relative price changes. 
What about Technology Diffusion? 
The process of technological change ends with diffusion. Technological advances are of 
little use unless society makes use of the innovation. Diffusion refers to the process by which a 
new technology gradually penetrates the relevant market. Often times, a technology that appears 
to surpass competing technologies in performance and cost will not immediately be chosen over 
existing technologies. A key question is whether this slow diffusion is a result of rational actors 
responding to varying incentives or due to market inefficiencies. As the preceding sections 
illustrate, there is a robust literature on the links between environmental policy and innovation, 
including both empirical studies and policy modeling, as well as representations of LBD. In 
contrast, diffusion of environmental technologies once they become cost-effective receives less 
attention. While diffusion is clearly a distinct area of empirical work, climate models diverge in 
their treatment of diffusion: top-down models without technology detail typically subsume 
diffusion into trends in sectoral productivity, while technology-rich bottom-up models typically 
include more ad hoc assumptions to constrain the penetration of new technologies.  
Despite the mixed and relatively ad hoc treatment of diffusion in climate models, 
encouraging the diffusion of new technologies is clearly an important policy goal. Examples of 
policies that encourage diffusion of alternative technologies include tax credits for hybrid 
vehicles and California’s Million Solar Roofs plan. In this section, we briefly review the 
empirical and simulation literature on technology diffusion. Here, there a couple of issues to 
consider. One is the time lag between invention and adoption. Second is the flow of knowledge 
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across regions. In each case, we ask where each strand of research could usefully inform or be 
informed by the other. 
The Timing of Diffusion 
The diffusion of a new technology is a gradual, dynamic process; new technologies are 
not adopted en masse. Rather, adoption usually begins with a few early adopters, followed by a 
period of more rapid adoption, with the rate of adoption leveling off once most potential users 
have adopted the technology. This process generates the well-known S-shaped diffusion curve: 
the rate of adoption rises slowly at first, speeds up, and then levels off as market saturation 
approaches. The figure on page 30 illustrates such a curve, with market penetration plotted on 
the y-axis and the passage of time plotted on the x-axis. Early attempts to explain this process 
focused on the spread of information (e.g., epidemic models, such as Griliches [1957]) and 
differences among firms (e.g., probit models, such as David [1969]). More recently, researchers 
combined these explanations while adding potential strategic decisions of firms. These papers 
find that firm-specific differences explain most variation in adoption rates, suggesting that 
gradual diffusion is a rational process in response to varying incentives faced by individual 
actors.  
Environmental technologies can be different, however. Incentives to adopt end-of-pipe 
technologies that serve only to reduce emissions must come from environmental regulation. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the few studies that address adoption of environmental 
technologies find that regulations dominate all other firm-specific factors. Gray and Shadbegian 
(1998), Kemp (1998), Kerr and Newell (2003) and Popp (2005) all show that environmental 
regulations increase the probability of adopting environmentally friendly technologies. While the 
response varies by firm characteristics, regulations are the most important explanatory variable.  
In contrast, energy-efficiency and fuel-saving technologies may be adopted more slowly, 
as it is cost savings, rather than a direct regulatory requirement, that matter. This can be 
influenced by policies that raise prices. Rose and Joskow (1990), for example, find that the 
adoption of fuel-saving technology by U.S. electric utilities is correlated positively with fuel 
prices. However, gradual diffusion is more likely and, even without climate policy, some 
adoption will occur, much like traditional technologies. 
This suggests that modeling climate policy ideally would distinguish among different 
types of climate-mitigating technology, with particular emphasis on whether they might be 
subject to direct regulation. For example, mandating IGCC plants, hybrid cars, or even more 
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efficient building shells would imply more rapid technology diffusion of the sort noted for end-
of-pipe technologies. Such policies might be motivated in part because of evidence of market 
failures in technology adoption beyond the pricing of greenhouse gas externalities. Jaffe and 
Stavins (1995) find that higher energy prices lead to greater use of insulation in new home 
construction but that the costs of installation are a more important consideration. This is part of a 
more general literature that finds inefficiencies in adoption of energy-saving technologies by 
consumers, with various explanations ranging from consumers using high discount rates, to 
credit-constrained consumers caring more about up-front costs than lifetime cost savings, to 
uncertainty over future costs (Jaffe et al., 2003). Hence, while the general result of the diffusion 
literature is that gradual diffusion is rational, market failures may contribute to slower adoption 
of energy-efficient technologies. 
Despite the interest in these types of policies, most top-down climate models without 
technology detail typically aggregate to the industry level. Such models have a difficult time 
modeling technology mandates, let alone making technology diffusion responsive to such 
policies. Bottom-up models and others with technology detail do have the capability to model 
such mandates but instead tend to focus on ad hoc and unresponsive assumptions constraining 
technology diffusion. The MERGE model, for example, assumes new technologies are 
constrained to 1 percent of production in the year they are introduced and can expand by a factor 
of three in each decade thereafter (Manne and Richels 2002). The NEMS model used by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration uses both adjustment costs to increase the short-run costs of 
rapidly increasing capacity and absolute constraints based work by Mansfield and Blackman 
(DiPardo 2000). In contrast, the IGSM model introduces an additional, fixed factor that acts as 
an adjustment cost to mimic gradual penetration (McFarland et al. 2004). While this does make 
penetration responsive to price incentives, it does not consider the potential increase in diffusion 
rates created by a mandate or targeted regulation. 
Absent this interest in modeling the effect of mandates on diffusion, it is worth noting 
that in many cases, simplistic representations that basically ignore diffusion may be sufficient. It 
is not unusual to see market penetration of a product in 10 years or less. For example, Popp 
(2001) finds that new energy patents have their largest effect on energy consumption within four 
years. Combined with the results of Popp (2002) that find that the median lag of energy-
patenting activity with respect to prices is also about 4 years, this suggests that the main effect of 
price-induced technological change will occur within one decade. Thus, gradual diffusion will be 
less relevant in models where the time periods modeled are decades rather than individual years. 
Moreover, in highly stylized models that include highly aggregate representations of technology, 
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calibrating the model based on the observed effects of technological change will implicitly allow 
for diffusion, as the observed effects are not the full potential of technology but rather the 
realized gains from technology that has diffused. For example, Schwoon and Tol (2006) develop 
a top-down model that includes adjustment costs that effectively slow the penetration of new 
technology.  
Diffusion across Regions 
A further complication to modeling the generation and adoption of new technologies is 
the flow of these technologies across regions. This is particularly important when we consider 
technologies available to developing countries, such as China or India. The vast majority of 
R&D effort occurs in highly developed countries. In 2000, global R&D expenditures were at 
least $729 billion—82 percent of this research was done in the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development countries and half was performed by the United States and Japan 
alone (National Science Board 2006). Moreover, in a global economy, policies in one nation may 
affect innovation in other nations. This is particularly likely when the regulating economy is an 
important market for other nations. For example, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) find that the 
majority of vehicle air-emissions patents granted in the United States are from foreign nations, 
even though the United States was the first country to adopt strict emissions standards.  
There is a large body of literature on technological diffusion across countries (surveyed 
by Keller [2004]) but little work focusing specifically on environmental technologies. In general, 
there are two potential avenues through which foreign knowledge generally can have an 
influence in the domestic economy. First, as noted in our discussion of R&D spillovers, foreign 
knowledge may affect the productivity of domestic R&D. The “blueprints” represented by 
foreign patents may serve to inspire additional innovation by domestic inventors. Such 
productivity increases are knowledge spillovers, as the knowledge represented by the foreign 
patent creates a positive externality—knowledge from abroad that is borrowed by the domestic 
inventor (Griliches 1979). Second, new technologies owned by foreigners simply may be diffuse 
and adopted directly by domestic firms. 
Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti (2003) provide perhaps the only example of foreign-
knowledge spillovers in a simulation model, with a somewhat ad hoc calibration of spillover 
parameters to match R&D-output ratios. More generally, knowledge spillovers, and especially 
international technology transfer (after a technology is available for export), have not been 
modeled directly in simulations of climate policy. Given these two avenues for knowledge to 
enter the economy, representing foreign-knowledge influences is an important area for 
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development in integrated assessment models. At the same time, empirical research on the extent 
to which foreign knowledge influences domestic inventors will be necessary to calibrate these 
models, as little of the work on foreign-knowledge spillovers is at the level of aggregation 
necessary to calibrate such a model.  
There also may be need to consider the interaction of international diffusion and domestic 
R&D. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and Popp (2006c), for example, find evidence of innovation in 
countries that adopt regulations late, suggesting that these countries do not always take 
advantage of technologies “off the shelf” that have been developed elsewhere. Instead, adaptive 
R&D seems to be necessary to suit the technology to the local market, as these later patents are 
more likely to cite earlier foreign, rather than domestic, inventions. The need for adaptive R&D 
suggests that either: a) diffusion across countries will be slower than within countries, as an 
additional research step is needed to fit the technology to local conditions; or b) that foreign 
knowledge adopted directly (i.e., without adaptive R&D) will be an “imperfect fit” for local 
conditions and thus will be less effective than in the technology’s initial market. 
Conclusion 
Technological change is at once the most important and least understood feature driving 
the future cost of climate-change mitigation. Quantitative research has tended to follow two 
distinct and often isolated paths: empirical, microeconomic work on the nature of R&D and 
technological progress and simulation modeling of macroeconomic models with some 
technology detail and assumptions about how productivity and technology cost respond to 
various activities. While these simulation models often are used to provide quantitative guidance 
to policy debates, a review of recent work suggests that efforts to endogenize technological 
change often fail to calibrate themselves to important empirical benchmarks, at worst, and fail to 
clearly communicate their assumptions, at best. Meanwhile, microeconomic research often fails 
to focus on important questions asked by the simulation modelers. 
What might a coherent research agenda look like, based on a review of both research 
areas? First, simulation models should communicate more clearly what benchmarks are being 
matched in terms of baseline productivity growth and energy-price elasticities, as well as the 
gross and net returns to energy R&D (both incremental and discrete increases from the baseline). 
To the extent that models involve multi-sector, or multi-region, R&D, assumptions about 
spillovers should be explained. When models include both R&D and LBD, efforts to avoid 
double counting the potential for R&D or experience to lower costs should be explained. 
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Second, microeconomic work should attempt to provide more information about 
spillovers across industries and regions. A high priority should be efforts to disentangle R&D 
and learning-by-doing effects to avoid the double counting just noted. Finally, given the 
prevalence of government R&D proposals, it would be valuable to explore the relative 
contribution of public versus private R&D. Simulation work also might usefully explore how 
both types of R&D could be usefully employed in a model. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Third Assessment Report on 
Mitigation noted the importance of exogenous technology assumptions, particularly the rate of 
improvement in energy efficiency, in estimating mitigation costs. Six years later, the Fourth 
Assessment Report on Mitigation describes a veritable explosion of research into how 
endogenizing technological change affects costs. Yet, in many ways, we are no closer to 
understanding the answer of how policies will affect the overall rate and direction of 
technological change. We have replaced previously transparent, exogenous assumptions with 
complex and often opaque assumptions about endogenous pathways. With a more coherent 
agenda combining empirical microeconomic analysis with a clear eye to the needs of the 
community of simulation modelers, and vice versa, perhaps we can improve our understanding 
of how technological change is likely to respond to current and future mitigation policies. 
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